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Abstract. Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) system is the state-of-
the-art train control system. In a CBTC system, to guarantee the safety of train
operation, trains communicate with each other intensively and adjust their con-
trol modes autonomously by computing critical control parameters, e.g. velocity
range, according to the information they get. As the correctness of the control
parameters generated are critical to the safety of the system, a method to verify
these parameters is a strong desire in the area of train control system.
In this paper, we use our experience learned during verifying a CBTC system to
present our ideas of how to model and verify the control parameter calculations
in a CBTC system efficiently.
– As the behavior of the system is highly nondeterministic, it is difficult to
build and verify the complete behavior space model of the system offline in
advance. Thus, we propose to model the system according to the ongoing
behavior model induced by the control parameters.
– As the parameters are generated online and updated very quickly, say every
500 milliseconds in the case we met, the verification result will be meaning-
less if it is given beyond the time bound, since by that time the model will
be changed already. Thus, we propose a method to verify the existence of
certain dangerous scenarios in the model online quickly.
To demonstrate the feasibility of these proposed approaches, we present the com-
posed linear hybrid automata with readable shared variables as a modeling lan-
guage to model the control parameters calculation and give a path-oriented reach-
ability analysis technique for the scenario-based verification of this model. We
demonstrate the model built for the CBTC system, and show the performance of
our technique in fast online verification. Last but not least, as CBTC system is a
typical CPS system, we also give a short discussion of the potential directions for
CPS verification in this paper.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, as communication has been embedded deeply into our daily life, compu-
tation has evolved from locating in one single standalone device to the collaboration
of networks of equipments. In such a manner, more and more systems work in open
environments, receive signals and stimuli from sensors, actuators and networks, then
calculate their control modes and parameters accordingly. The newly generated control
modes and parameters will control the behavior of the system itself and the behavior
of other components in the network as well dynamically. These systems have a tight
integration of information systems and physical devices, which are named as Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS)[13].
By combining communication, computation and control (3C), in a CPS system
physical devices can have more knowledge of the environment they are working in
and the real-time status of the other elements which they are collaborating with. Thus,
devices can autonomously generate more accurate instructions and gain advantages like
safety, reliability and efficiency.
Public transportation is a typical area where CPS systems are emerging and play-
ing more and more important roles. CBTC is the state-of-the-art technique in the train
control area and fundamental for the building and controlling of high speed railway sys-
tems. During trains running on railways, the radio block center (RBC) will collect the
position of each train periodically and compute the movement authority (MA), which
is the distance that the train is authorized to go, for each train. Then the onboard train
controller will compute the feasible velocity range by taking account of the movement
authority and the current running parameters of the train, e.g., current position, velocity
and etc. These are typical procedures of a CBTC system, which is clearly a Cyber-
Physical System. One of the most important questions concern the design engineers of
CBTC system is whether the parameters generated by the control functions used in the
system are correct, e.g. trains will not collide with each other during operation.
In general, if we can build a model for the control parameter calculations and verify
it, we can answer the correctness of parameters. Currently, most of the verification
works consist of the following two steps: First, build the complete static formal model
of the system. Second, verify the correctness of the model under the given property
offline using techniques like model checking[8]. For CBTC systems, as the input of
the control functions, e.g. current velocity, position, movement authority and etc., are
generated and collected online, it is hard to predict the complete behavior space of the
system under verification. Thus, it is difficult to build and verify a complete static model
of the system’s behavior offline in advance. To overcome this problem, we discuss our
opinions about the verification of control parameter calculations in CBTC as follows:
– Modeling
• As discussed above, it is hard to build and verify the complete behavior space
model of the control functions offline in advance. We propose that the model
should focus on the ongoing static behavior of the system in the short future
driven by the current control parameter.
• For modeling the ongoing behavior of the running CBTC systems, as the sys-
tem is composed by large number of components, e.g., one control system for
each train running on track, the model should be a composed system naturally.
• Data are transmitted along with communication between components. Thus,
the modeling language needs to support the representation of the synchroniza-
tion among components and the data transmission along with it.
– Verification
• The verification problem will not try to prove whether the control functions are
correct or not. The verification procedure will focus on giving answers of the
correctness of current parameters.
• As models are generated online, the verification procedure needs to be carried
out online. As the model for the system will be updated quickly, it is necessary
to give the verification result before the model is changed, which means the
verification has to be time bounded and fast.
• A set of parameters can basically induce a series of operation modes in the short
future, which can consist several scenarios of the operation of the system. What
need to be verified is the existence of certain scenarios in the behavior of the
model, which is represented as the reachability of certain paths in the model.
Therefore, from both the point of views of modeling and verification, in this paper
we propose a new method to prove the correctness of the parameter calculations on-
line during the CBTC system is in operation, which can result in an additional device
deployed on-site, monitoring and guaranteeing the correctness of parameters online.
Based on this scheme, we present a formal model named as Hybrid Automata with
Readable Shared Variable to model the control parameter calculations of the CBTC
system, and a path-oriented reachability verification technique to verify the reachability
property along with a path set in the model to achieve the goal of fast online verifica-
tion. To demonstrate the feasibility of this scheme, the model for the control parameter
calculations of the CBTC system is given in the paper, and several case studies are con-
ducted on the model to illustrate the performance of the fast online verification.
Structure of The Paper. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
give a brief description of the running example of our study: Communication based
train control system and summarize the requirements of verifying the control parameter
calculations in a CBTC system. In Sec.3, we present our modeling language for the
CBTC system: Composed Hybrid System with Readable Shared Variables, give the
model we built for the CBTC system and show how to verify the existence of given
critical scenarios on the system by the path-oriented reachability analysis method. Sec.4
verifies the existence of the dangerous scenarios in the model we built for the CBTC
system and demonstrates the process ability of the path-oriented reachability method
in online verification of CBTC systems. Sec.5 summarizes the related works on the
verification of train control systems and proposes several potential directions in the
verification of CPS systems based on our experience in verifying the CBTC system.
Finally, the conclusion is stated in Sec.6.
2 Motivating Example: CBTC System
2.1 Communication Based Train Control System
A train control system is the heart for the safe and efficient operation of train systems.
There are many organizations and projects devoted to the research and development of
the train control system with high dependability. Many standards are proposed to give
detail and comprehensive rule sets and guidances for the operation of railway systems
for inter-vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure cooperation, like European Train Control
System(ETCS)[5], and Chinese Train Control System (CTCS)[6]. According to differ-
ent infrastructure utilities, data transmission methods and train control methodologies,
ETCS/CTCS is divided up into several different equipmental and functional levels.
Communication based train control system (CBTC), on the high level of ETCS/CTCS,
is believed to be the most advanced signaling technique and the fundamental method
underlying the latest high speed railway systems. It uses data communication between
trains and various control facilities to guarantee the safety and efficiency of train op-
eration. It can be abstractly divided into two main parts: ground systems and onboard
systems. Ground systems can track the runtime status of all the trains periodically. The
radio block center (RBC) will send the needed information, e.g., movement authority,
to the onboard systems on the train. Then the onboard systems will compute the ve-
locity curve autonomously by taking account of the movement authority they received
and the current operation status of the train. Ideally, the movement authority basically
indicates a End-of-Authority (EOA) point[15,16] which is with rear safe distance to the
end of the train ahead. During the train operation, it also needs to guarantee that there
is enough space for the train to completely stop by emergency braking before touching
the EOA point, which is named as “Safe braking distance”(SBD). A simple illustration
of the communication and movement authority granting is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Sample Scenario of A Running CBTC system
Our running example is a typical CBTC system which is supposed to be used in a
Urban Railway System in China. As the system is still under designing and debugging,
our team join into the project to help verifying the correctness of the design of the ATP
module of the CBTC system. One of the most interested question which bothers the
engineers from the area of railway system is how to guarantee the absence of certain
dangerous scenarios, e.g., train collision. We will use some of these scenarios to show
the motivation of this paper, and introduce our thoughts about the verification of control
parameter calculations in CBTC system.
In the design, all the trains need to communicate with RBC in 500 milliseconds
period. RBC will grant the movement authority to each train by telling them the position
of the EOA points. After that, the onboard computer will start to calculate the legal
operation speed by taking account of the current speed of train, the limitation of the
train and the track and so on. The train is free to move under the generated operating
speed before reaching the safe braking distance point (SBD) which is with safe braking
distance away from the EOA point. Once a SBD point is reached, the train will brake
immediately to try to stop completely before move beyond the EOA point. When the
train has not receive any signal from RBC for 5 seconds, the automatic train protection
(ATP) module of the CBTC system will take over the control of the train operation and
ask the train to brake urgently as well. What the designers are worried about is whether
the train can stop safely under the control parameters without beyond the movement
authority and collide with the train ahead under certain scenarios.
2.2 Requirements For Verifying Control Parameter Calculations In The CBTC
System
For verifying the control parameter calculations in the CBTC system, we need to build
the formal model for the system and summarize the characteristics of the CBTC system
at first:
– Modeling
• Static Model For Time-Bounded Behavior. As the behavior of the CBTC sys-
tem is highly nondeterministic, e.g., the input of the control functions including
lots of runtime dynamic parameters, it is difficult to predict the complete be-
havior of the system or even verify it. Thus, the modeling and verification effort
should focus on the ongoing behavior after synchronization or receiving signals
which is the deterministic part of the entire nondeterministic behavior space.
• Compositional Verification. The running CBTC system has all the operating
trains on track and RBCs included. These components communicate with each
other intensively, which is a concurrent system naturally. For each component,
due to the dynamical behavior of system, it should be a hybrid automata. Thus,
the model for the system should be a composed hybrid system.
• Shared Label and Variable. The modeling language has to support the repre-
sentation of the synchronization between components. Data are also transmit-
ted during the synchronization. This is natural, because a component running
in a system can not read the other components’ running parameters at anytime.
We propose to use shared labels to represent the synchronization among com-
ponent automata, and communication with other components are represented
as shared variables in transition guards and reset actions on shared labels.
– Verification
• Online and Fast Verification. As the environment of the CBTC working in is
changing quickly, 500 ms in the running example, if we cannot give answer to
the verification questions in 500 ms, the result will be meaningless. Thus, once
a set of control parameters is calculated, the verification module needs to give
a quick answer of whether this set of parameters will violate certain properties,
e.g., safety. Therefore, The verification should be online and fast.
• Control Parameters Driven Verification. As the verification procedure needs
to be online and fast, it will not try to determine the correctness of the com-
plex control functions beneath the system, but only give a quick answer to the
correctness of the parameters generated.
• Time-Bounded and Scenario-Based Verification. According to the require-
ments of designers of the certain CBTC system, the verification problem they
concern most is checking whether certain bad scenarios will happen in the con-
trol modes induced by the current parameters. The scenario will be translated
as a sequence of control modes in the model, which constitutes a path. Thus,
what needs to be verified is the reachability of certain property along with the
path/scenario.
In summary, we think the modeling language for the control parameter calculations
in CBTC system is composed hybrid automata with support of shared labels and shared
variable reading. The model of the system should be a small static model induced by
generated control parameters. The verification procedure should be scenario based path-
oriented compositional reachability analysis.
3 Verifying The Control Parameter Calculations in CTBC systems
3.1 Modeling of The CBTC System
For a CBTC system in a train, the set of control parameters includes the current velocity
range, the target velocity range, the location of the end of movement authority (EOA)
point, the location of the safe braking distance (SBD) point, the position of the train
itself and so on. Thus, this set of parameters shows a clear dynamic behavior of the
train along with time, which can be modeled as a hybrid automaton (HA) naturally.
Now, let’s raise the field of our view from a single train to a series of trains running
in a track. We will see that trains will communicate with RBCs and other trains during
operation periodically. Data, e.g., the location of the train ahead, are transmitted to each
train along with the communication. Thus, the model for the complete system should be
a composed hybrid automata. Furthermore, in the composed system, component HAs
synchronize with each other using shared labels, and a component can only read the
value of the variable of other components on shared labels.
Based on the above discussion, we give the definition of the class of HA we pro-
posed for CBTC systems as following:
Definition 1. A hybrid automaton with readable outer variables (HARV) is a tuple H =
(Xl, X s, Σl, Σ s,V,V0, E, α, β, γ), where
- Xl is a finite set of real-valued variables which belongs to H; X s is a finite set of
real-valued variables which don’t belong to H, but can be read by H in certain
position; Xl ∩ X s = ∅
- Σl is a finite set of local event labels which belongs to H only; Σ s is a finite set of
event labels which belongs to several HARV ; Σl ∩ Σ s = ∅
- V is a finite set of locations; V0 ⊆ V is a set of initial locations.
- E is a transition relation whose elements are of the form (v, σ, φ, ψ, v′), where v, v′
are in V , σ ∈ Σl ∪ Σ s is a label, φ is a set of transition guards of the form f (y) ≤ a,
and ψ is a set of reset actions of the form x := f (y), where x ∈ Xl, a ∈ R, and
• if σ ∈ Σl, y ∈ Xl;
• if σ ∈ Σ s, y ∈ Xl ∪ X s, if y ∈ X s, we say σ is y related ;
- α is a labeling function which maps each location in V to a location invariant which
is a set of variable constraints of the form f (y) ≤ a where y ∈ Xl, a ∈ R.
- β is a labeling function which maps each location in V to a set of flow conditions
which are of the form x˙ = g(y) where x ∈ Xl. For any v ∈ V , for any x ∈ Xl, there
is one and only one flow condition x˙ = g(y) ∈ β(v), where x, y ∈ Xl.
- γ is a labeling function which maps each location in V0 to a set of initial conditions
which are of the form x = a where x ∈ Xl and a ∈ R. For any v ∈ V0, for any
x ∈ Xl, there is at most one initial condition definition x = a ∈ γ(v).
If each f (y) is a linear expression, and g(y) = [a, b], where a, b ∈ R, we say this
HARV is a LHARV (linear hybrid automaton with readable outer variables).
For a group of HARV , their composition CHARV is defined as a product HARV gen-
erated by synchronizing all the components with respect to the shared labels.
Definition 2. Let H1 = (Xl1, X s1, Σl1, Σ s1,V1,V01 , E1, α1, β1, γ1) and H2 = (Xl2, X s2, Σl2, Σ s2,V2
,V02 , E2, α2, β2, γ2) be two HARVs, where Xl1 ∩ Xl2 = ∅, Σl1 ∩Σl2 = ∅. The composition of
H1 and H2, denoted as H1||H2, is a HARV N = (Xl, X s, Σl, Σ s,V,V0, E, α, β, γ) where
– Xl = Xl1 ∪ X
l
2; X
s = {X s1 ∪ X
s
2} \ {X
l
1 ∪ X
l
2};
– Σl = Σl1 ∪ Σ
l
2 ∪ {Σ
s
1 ∩ Σ
s
2}; Σ
s = Σ s1 ∪ Σ
s
2;
– V = V1 × V2; V0 = V01 × V
0
2 ;
– α((v1, v2)) = α(v1) ∪ α(v2); β((v1, v2)) = β(v1) ∪ β(v2); γ((v1, v2)) = γ(v1) ∪ γ(v2);
– E is defined as follows:
- for a ∈ Σ s1 ∩ Σ
s
2, for every (v1, a, φ1, ψ1, v′1) in E1 and (v2, a, φ2, ψ2, v′2) in E2, E
contains ((v1, v2), a, φ1 ∪ φ2, ψ1 ∪ ψ2, (v′1, v′2));
- for a ∈ Σl1∪{Σ
s
1 \Σ
s
2}, for every (v, a, φ, ψ, v′) in E1 and every t in V2, E contains
((v, t), a, φ, ψ, (v′, t));
- for a ∈ Σl2∪{Σ
s
2 \Σ
s
1}, for every (v, a, φ, ψ, v′) in E2 and every t in V1, E contains
((t, v), a, φ, ψ, (t, v′)).
For all m > 2, the composition of HARV H1,H2, . . . ,Hm, denoted as H1||H2|| . . . ||Hm,
is a HARV which is defined recursively as H1||H2|| . . . ||Hm = H1||H′ where H′ =
H2||H3|| . . . ||Hm.
Using the formal language defined above, we build a set of models of the system
which includes nonlinear control functions as shown below. These models consist of
two main parts:
– n trains running on the track, the automaton for each train is shown in Fig.2.A.
– m RBC centers, the automaton for each RBC is shown in Fig.2.B.
From Fig.2, we can see the behavior of the system consists of the following aspects:
– Trains and RBCs communicate by two labels updateMA and syn.
– After the global synchronization syn, an RBC will get the running parameters from
the related train. Then the RBC will perform preprocess job before it starts to com-
pute and assign the latest MA to the related trains.
– After preprocessing, RBC will compute the new MA for the related trains using
complex function k() and send them to the related trains by shared label updateMA.
– When received the new MA, each train will compute the local velocity and SBD
using control function f () and g(), and it will start to adjust the running velocity
from current value [ci, c′i] to the latest value range [ni, n′i].
Fig. 2. Hybrid Automata For Traini Using CBTC and RBC Center RBC j
– During the adjustment period, we abstract the velocity to the mean of the old and
new value of the velocity range.
– After the train Traini is running under the new velocity range, it will keep checking
the current position to make sure it has not move beyond the safe braking point.
– Once the safe braking point is touched, the train will start to brake normally to try
to stop completely before touching the end of the movement authority.
– And if the train has safely operated for 5 seconds without receiving any commu-
nication signal, the train will assume the communication channel is broken and an
emergency braking will be executed immediately.
– Once a train starts the procedure of braking, it must stop completely in less than 5
seconds.
Considering a system with dozens of subsystems, e.g., trains and RBCs, and with
complex nonlinear functions f (), g(), k() included, it will be very difficult to verify prop-
erties on the model, as widely reported in literature [21]. Furthermore, many parameters
used in functions f (), g() and k() are collected and generated online nondeterministi-
cally, e.g., temporary speed limitation, wind speed, mass of the train and etc, even there
is a method to verify the complex nonlinear function, as these critical parameters cannot
be predicted ahead precisely, the offline verification of the system is still very difficult.
3.2 Scenario Based Verification and Path-oriented Reachability Analysis
For the verification of the control parameter calculations in CBTC systems, one of the
problems which the designers concern most is when Traini starts to brake, whether it
can stop completely before passing the EOA point or even collide with the ahead train
under the generated parameters. This problem indicates an execution scenario of the
behavior of each train in the system, from location compute to Ebraking, and a target
property to verify: the physical position of Traini equals with the ahead one Traini−1.
Scenario-Based Automata. As discussed in the last section, the verification of the
given scenario-based property on the models given in Fig.2 is very difficult. On the other
hand, the control parameters generated by the control functions can induce a static con-
trol model of the behavior of the CBTC system in the short future before the generation
of the next set of parameters.
Based on this idea, we simplify the models given in the last section. As the control
parameters are already calculated and saved, e.g. maci and sbdci for the movement au-
thority and safe braking distance of Traini, the control functions can be dismissed in the
new scenario-based model. The component RBCs can also be dismissed from the sys-
tem, because the scenario-based automaton stands for the behavior of the system after
the latest MA is already granted and before the next communication, during that period
the train Traini doesn’t have to communicate with any RBC. As a result, we build the
scenario-based static running automata for Traini to a LHARV as below in Fig.3.
Fig. 3. Scenario Based LHARV For Traini Using CBTC
This scenario on a single LHARV Traini is presented as an evolution of the system
from locations to locations, e.g., 〈comp〉−→
cvi
〈ad just〉−→
opi
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrake
〈EBrake〉 in the
automaton Traini. Using the same notion given in [11], we name such a sequence of
locations as a path. By assigning each location with an nonnegative real number, we can
get a timed sequence in the form of
〈
comp
δ0
〉
−→
cvi
〈
ad just
δ1
〉
−→
opi
〈
cruise
δ2
〉
−→
EBrake
〈
EBrake
δ3
〉
.
This timed sequence represents a behavior of the model such that the system starts at lo-
cation compute, stays there for δ0 time units, then jumps to location ad just by transition
cvi and stays at ad just for δ1 time units, and so on.
Let N = H1||H2|| . . . ||Hm be a CLHARV where Hi = (Xli , X si , Σli , Σ si ,Vi,V0i , Ei, αi, βi, γi)
(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is an LHARV and ρ be a path in N of the form ρ = 〈v0〉
(φ0,ψ0)
−→
σ0
〈v1〉
(φ1,ψ1)
−→
σ1
. . .
(φn−1,ψn−1)
−→
σn−1
〈vn〉. It follows that vi = (vi1, vi2, . . . , vim) (0 ≤ i ≤ n) where vik ∈
Vk (1 ≤ k ≤ m). For any k (1 ≤ k ≤ m), we construct the sequence ρk from ρ as
follows: replace any vi with vik (0 ≤ i ≤ n), and for any
(φi−1,ψi−1)
−→
σi−1
〈vik〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if
(vi−1k, σi−1, φ, ψ, vik) ∈ Ek, then replace it with
(φ,ψ)
−→
σi−1
〈vik〉, otherwise remove it. It follows
that ρk is a path in Hk. We say that ρk is the projection of ρ on Hk. Intuitively, ρk is the
execution trace of N on Hk when N runs along ρ. Thus, the complete scenario is a path
set for the system, consisting of one path for each component.
Reachability Specification. Now, let us look at the reachability specification: Dur-
ing braking, Traini collide with the ahead train Traini−1, which means the position of
Traini is the same with the ahead one Traini−1 in the location EBraking. This property
can be formally translated as Traini.x = Traini−1.x in location EBraking.
For an LHARV H = (Xl, X s, Σl, Σ s,V,V0, E, α, β, γ), a reachability specification,
denoted as R(v, ϕ), consists of a location v in H and a set ϕ of variable constraints of
the form a ≤ c0x0 + c1x1 + · · · + clxl ≤ b where xi ∈ Xl ∪ X s for any i (0 ≤ i ≤ l), a, b
and ci (0 ≤ i ≤ l) are real numbers.
Definition 3. Let H = (X, Σ,V,V0, E, α, β, γ) be an LHARV , and R(v, ϕ) be a reachabil-
ity specification. A behavior of H of the form
〈
v0
δ0
〉
(φ0 ,ψ0)
−→
σ0
〈
v1
δ1
〉
(φ1,ψ1)
−→
σ1
. . .
(φn−1,ψn−1)
−→
σn−1
〈
vn
δn
〉
satisfies R(v, ϕ) iff vn = v and each variable constraint in ϕ is satisfied when the automa-
ton has stayed in vn for delay δn, i.e. for each variable constraint a ≤ c0x0 + c1x1 + · · ·+
clxl ≤ b in ϕ, a ≤ c0ζn(x0) + c1ζn(x1) + · · · + cmζn(xl) ≤ b where ζn(xk) (0 ≤ k ≤ l) rep-
resents the value of xk when the automaton has stayed at vn for the delay δn. H satisfies
R(v, ϕ) iff there is a behavior of H which satisfies R(v, ϕ).
Definition 4. Let N = H1||H2|| . . . ||Hm be a CLHARV , P = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρm} be a path set,
where ρi is a finite path in Hi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), and R(v, ϕ) be a reachability specification.
P satisfies R(v, ϕ) if and only if there is a path ρ of N that the projection of ρ on Hi is
ρi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), and there is a behavior of N which satisfies R(v, ϕ).
Path-Oriented Reachability Analysis. In this paragraph, we will show how to verify
the reachability specification along with a path set in a CLHARV system using linear
programming efficiently.
Generally speaking, the model checking problem for hybrid systems is very diffi-
cult. Even for a single LHA, the reachability analysis problem is undecidable [1,2,3].
The performance of existing techniques for compositional analysis of LHA systems is
even worse. The state-of-the-art tool HYTECH [4] and its improvement PHAVer [7]
need to compute the composition of the whole system into a unique global automaton
then use expensive polyhedra computation for reachability analysis, which will suffer
the problem of state explosion and greatly restrict the solvable problem size.
To overcome this drawback, in study[11] we presented an efficient approach for
the path-oriented reachability analysis of LHA compositions. This technique checks a
group of paths at a time, one path for each LHA, all of the paths are transformed into
a group of linear constraints automatically. Then, a few constraints about the system
integration according to the synchronization events in each path will be added to ensure
that the components cooperate correctly. It follows that the reachability problem along
those specific paths can be reduced to a linear program. Using this method both the
path length and the number of participant automata checked can be scaled up greatly
to satisfy practical requirements. This approach of symbolic execution of paths can be
used by design engineers to check critical paths, and thereby increases the faith in the
system correctness. This path-oriented technique can be easily scaled to use in CLHARV
systems. We will use a simple example to illustrate our idea below.
Fig. 4. Sample Automata And The Path-oriented Reachability Encoding
For example, Fig.4(A) gives a simple system consisting of three subsystems: S , T ,
and K which synchronize with each other by shared labels b, e, and f . Each system has
one variable, s for S , t for T , k for K. The flow conditions for each variable are unified
as x˙ ∈ [0.9, 1.1] in all the locations. The values of data are transmitted along with some
of the shared labels, for example in label e of T , the transition guard is s + t > k. The
reachability specification is whether the property s + 2t − 3k = 0 can be satisfied at the
global location (s5, t5, k5).
In our path-oriented approach, for each of these three paths we generate a group of
linear constraints that represents all the timed runs corresponding to the path. Take the
path 〈t1〉 → 〈t2〉 → 〈t3〉 → 〈t4〉 → 〈t5〉 of the system T for example:
– Use
〈
ti
δti
〉
to indicate that the system has stayed in location ti for time delay δi (non-
negative variable). The behavior of the system is represented by
〈
t1
δt1
〉
→
〈
t2
δt2
〉
→〈
t3
δt3
〉
→
〈
t4
δt4
〉
→
〈
t5
δt5
〉
where δt1, δ
t
2, δ
t
3, δ
t
4, δ
t
5 must satisfy all the time constraints
enforced by the system, which forms a group of linear constraints.
• For each location ti, two variables γi(t) and ζi(t) are generated to represent the
valuation of t when entering ti and leaving ti after stay there by δi time units.
• Take the location t3 for example, according to the flow condition, 1.1δt3+γ3(t) ≥
ζ3(t) ≥ 0.9δt3 + γ3(t).
• For the transition guard t < 5 on the local transition g, we have ζ4(t) < 5.
• For the reset action t = 2 on the local transition d, we have γ3(t) = 2.
– Synchronization constraints will be added to ensure that these three components
cooperate accurately according to the synchronization events, which are illustrated
by the dashed lines and S YN(event) in Fig.4(B).
• For the event b shared by S and T , we have δt1 = δ
s
1 + δ
s
2.
• For the transition constraints including outer variable reading, e.g., s + t > k in
e, we have ζ3(s) + ζ3(t) > ζ2(k).
• All the components have spent exact the same time, e.g., for S and T , we have
δs1 + δ
s
2 + δ
s
3 + δ
s
4 + δ
s
5 = δ
t
1 + δ
t
2 + δ
t
3 + δ
t
4 + δ
t
5.
• For reachability specification s+2t−3k = 0, we get ζ5(s)+2ζ5(t)−3ζ5(k) = 0.
Above all, the path-oriented reachability analysis problem is transformed to a feasi-
bility problem of a set of linear constraints. It is well-known that the feasibility problem
of linear constraints can be solved by linear programming (LP) technique efficiently.
Utilizing LP solver, we can develop an efficient tool for path-oriented reachability anal-
ysis of CLHARV where the length of the path, the size of each LHARV , and the number
of components are all close to the practical problem scales. Thus, we can gain the ob-
jective of fast verification of the existence of certain scenarios in the model of control
parameter calculations in CBTC systems.
4 Experimental Evaluation
To demonstrate the modeling and verification techniques for control parameter calcula-
tions in the CBTC system proposed in this paper and show the ability of fast verification
of the path-oriented reachability method, we verify the train collision scenario given in
the last section using the model built in Sec.3.
The scenario we selected to verify is if the communication channel fails during train
operation, whether all the train can stop safely without collide with each other, and the
corresponding scenario-based automata we built for each train is shown in Fig.3. The
model represents the path: 〈compute〉−→
cvi
〈ad justment〉−→
opi
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrake
〈EBraking〉
for each train Traini and the reachability specification is the positions of two nearby
trains are equal with each other, for example train1.x = train2.x. Since the system is
still under simulation and debugging, we use a group of traditional running values for
the parameters in the model from our colleagues in the railway area.
The experiments are conducted in an ongoing version of BACH[9,10], which is a
toolset for building LHA models and verifying the bounded reachability property of
LHA systems, and can be downloaded from http://seg.nju.edu.cn/BACH/. On
a DELL workstation (Intel Core2 Quad CPU 2.4GHz, 4GB RAM), we evaluate the
potential of the path-oriented reachability analysis method presented in this paper using
the CBTC model shown in Fig.3.
The experiment data is shown in Table.1. The largest problem BACH can solve in
500 ms consists of 16 trains which is a very complex system and enough for a running
urban railway system. According to the consultation to the engineers in the urban rail-
way company, it is expected that the number of trains under operation on a normal track
is around 15 to 20. Thus, the technique presented in this paper is applicable to be used
in daily operation. The parameter we used in the model is proved to be safe by verifi-
cation, which means certain path-oriented reachability specifications are not satisfied.
Meanwhile, the runtime memory overhead of the computation, which is not listed in
the table, is very small.
The data in Table.1 gives a clear demonstration of the process ability of fast ver-
ification of the bad scenario in the model for control parameter calculations. It also
strengthens our belief that this technique can be used online during system is in opera-
tion to guarantee the correctness of the important control parameters. As the linear pro-
gramming solver underlying BACH is a free collection of Java classes for research [12],
we believe if the linear programming package is replaced by an advanced commercial
one, the performance will be even better.
Table 1. Experimental Data on the CBTC System
Train1 〈compute〉−→
cv1
〈ad justment〉−→
op1
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrak
〈EBraking〉
Train2 〈compute〉−→
cv2
〈ad justment〉−→
op2
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrak
〈EBraking〉
Path . . . . . .
Trainn−1 〈compute〉 −→
cvn−1
〈ad justment〉 −→
opn−1
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrak
〈EBraking〉
Trainn 〈compute〉−→
cvn
〈ad justment〉−→
opn
〈cruise〉 −→
EBrak
〈EBraking〉
n Constraint Variable Time
8 1208 96 0.175s
10 1550 120 0.23s
12 1908 144 0.328s
14 2282 168 0.404s
16 2672 192 0.469s
5 Related Work and Further Discussion
5.1 Related Work
The verification of the train control system has been intensively studied. Study[17] gives
a method to generate the high level requirements from a subset of the specification of
a ETCS[5] system, and use method in[18] to verify the consistency between require-
ments. These two works belong to the category of requirement engineering, which don’t
touch real time behaviors of the system.
Study[19] models the communication in train control systems with Live Sequence
Chart (LSC), then validate the LSC by model checking and testing. Study[20] models
the behavior of train control systems by timed state transition systems and verify the
given property by bounded model checking and compositional reasoning. These studies
all give high level models for behaviors of the system without considering the dynamic
behavior of the movement of train.
Study[16] models a fully parametric ETCS system using differential dynamic logic
and verify the system by logical deductive verification. Study[15] builds different com-
plex models for different layers of a ETCS system and verify these models using layer-
specific technologies. These works build static model for the ETCS system without
considering the system as a dynamic system which works in open environment. Thus,
they only include rather limit parameters used in the control functions in the model.
5.2 Verification of CPS Systems
The new CPS computing paradigm brings new challenges and requirements to the
research community, like how to guarantee the qualities of service, how to generate
the formal models for the system and so on, which are proposed and summarized in
many studies like [13,14]. The CBTC system is a typical CPS system which combines
communication, computation and control tightly. From the experience we learned dur-
ing verify the CBTC system, we think Control Parameter Calculations Verification
could be an emerging topic in the verification of CPS systems. Furthermore, we sum-
marize following subtopics we think is worth studying and paying attention to:
– Modeling Language. CPS systems are running under dynamic environments. They
receive signals from each other and the environment in a unpredictable way. How
can the nondeterminism be modeled and verified? For CBTC systems, we choose to
use linear hybrid automata as the modeling language and focus on the modeling of
the ongoing static behavior of the system once the control parameters are generated.
How about for general CPS system, do we need to introduce an new language?
– Time Bounded Verification. Compared with classical verification which try to
prove the correctness of the complete behavior of the system, the verification of
CPS system focuses more on the correctness of the behavior in given time bound,
e.g., will the train collide with the ahead one in 500 milliseconds in this paper. This
is a new direction of Bounded Model Checking[22], where the term “bound” means
time, rather than “steps” used in classical Bounded Model Checking.
– Online and Fast Verification. As the control parameters of CPS system are chang-
ing quickly, the verification module needs to give a quick answer of the correctness
of the new generated set of parameters. We think it is necessary to investigate how
to build fast and low-overhead online verification techniques for CPS systems.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce our experience in modeling and verifying the control param-
eter calculations in a CBTC system which is a typical CPS system. Based on our study
of this system, we propose our ideas of the requirements for modeling and verifying
control parameters in a CBTC system. For modeling language, we think it should be a
composed hybrid system with support of component communication and data transmis-
sion. For verification technique, we insist the verification for CBTC systems should be
online and fast verification of the ongoing behavior in the short future, and the problem
needed to be verified is the existence of certain dangerous scenarios.
To demonstrate our ideas, we introduce a notion Composed Linear Hybrid Au-
tomata with Readable Shared Variables to model the behavior of the CBTC system
induced by the control parameters. We also present a path-oriented reachability analysis
method to achieve the objective of the online scenario-based verification. The experi-
ment results support our belief a lot by showing the great process ability of fast solving
of a system consists of 16 trains in less than 500 milliseconds which is the period of
parameter generation in the CBTC system.
Currently, with the help of our colleagues from railway areas, we are trying to im-
plement this technique into a standalone device which can be integrated and deployed
into the onboard ATP module as a part of the CBTC system to check the correctness of
the velocity range given by ATP. Safety critical scenarios can be enumerated by CBTC
engineers ahead, the model pattern corresponding to these scenarios can be designed
in advance also. Then the device can catch the latest generated parameter set, build the
related models using the pattern and verify them online. It is supposed to work as a
runtime monitor/checker on the train under experimentation to guarantee the safety of
the control parameters before the parameters are utilized.
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